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Abstract
The role of remanufacturing as a competitive tool for ﬁrms has been reﬂected in a number of studies to show that
remanufacturing can reduce the unit cost of production by reusing components. However, the fact that remanufac-
turing can be used as a strategic tool for serving secondary markets as well has not been acknowledged in the literature.
In this paper, we study the use of remanufacturing as a tool to serve secondary markets. Speciﬁcally, we model the case
of a reseller who procures used products based on an older generation of technology from an advanced market and then
uses one of two options: (a) she can either resell a small fraction of these used products in a developing market where
the technology is acceptable, or (b) she can invest in the remanufacturing of these products and then sell them in the
developing market at a higher price. The main result of the paper is that using remanufacturing to serve secondary
markets reduces the number of units procured from the advanced market for the reseller. In addition, we show based
on certain cost structures that the reseller is always better oﬀ if she uses remanufacturing to a certain extent.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Inventory/production; Stochastic; Multiproduct; Substitution; Newsvendor problem; Product acquisition management;
Remanufacturing
1. Introduction
The importance of remanufacturing as a tool of diﬀerentiating a ﬁrm in terms of cost and environmental
awareness has a signiﬁcant impact on the cost, demand of a product, and the bottom line of the ﬁrm (Guide
and Van Wassenhove, 2001). During the nascent years of the study of the ﬁeld of remanufacturing, the
beneﬁts were largely seen as cost driven, however, increasingly, the process of adopting remanufacturing
is also being driven by demand and consumer preferences. While markets often prefer remanufactured
products owing to the recycled components in the products, increasingly, resellers have been ﬁnding
that certain niche (secondary) markets may also prefer remanufactured products because the price per unit
is lower. It is interesting to note that the viability of operating in such secondary markets will increase
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as environmental laws get tightened in many countries forcing manufacturers to design products and
production processes so that a signiﬁcant percentage of product components and raw materials is reused
(Van der Laan et al., 1999).
The prospect of remanufacturing poses interesting questions for resellers when they make procurement
decisions from their supply markets. The goal of this paper is to develop a detailed understanding of the
implications of remanufacturing for resellers in secondary markets, both in terms of the markets that they
serve, and the markets that they procure their used products from.
In current practice, there are a number of examples of products where the model can be applied for
ﬁnding good procurement practice. For example, in industries of assembled products with a short product
life-cycle, used products or end-of-lease products are collected by resellers and distributed in secondary
markets either in an as-new condition or an as-is condition. Copiers and cellular phones are good examples
of such products where the added value of recovery is the main driver for remanufacturing if a product is
remanufactured to an as-new condition. To motivate this paper, we provide an example from the industry,
where the trade-oﬀs associated with the remanufacturing decision are illustrated. ReCellular Inc. is a re-
seller of mobile phones, which procures used and end-of-lease mobile phones from American markets and
then resells them in developing markets in the South American or African continents. The developing
markets do not sell phones based on the latest technologies as the prices charged are too high; hence, there
exists a market for these used mobile phones. ReCellular has two options with the phones that it has
procured: (a) it can either sell these phones directly without any value-adding activities in the developing
markets, or (b) it can add value in terms of remanufacturing the used phones to an as-new condition.
ReCellulars decision on procurement is made diﬃcult by the fact that their supply is heterogeneous, i.e., it
comes from a number of diﬀerent sources. While the heterogeneity comes from a number of sources, the
dominant source of diﬀerentiation in the state of quality of the used phones comes from the economic class of
the people from whom used phones are collected. As an example, consider a region that can be divided into
two neighborhoods that are economically disparate. The sources of used mobile phones that are collected
from regions are typically third parties which are small in size, for example, charity foundations. Used mobile
phones that are collected from the region from well-to-do neighborhoods are more expensive to acquire, and
have a higher quality and selling price, compared to phones which are acquired from the less aﬄuent areas.
While we did not do a demographical study to ﬁnd the underlying causes, we conjecture that this is due
partially to income eﬀects, and partially because people living in aﬄuent neighborhoods purchase phones of
better quality initially. Also, the high quality products have more features and they are made from com-
ponents of higher quality, hence, the yields associated with the used mobile phones from aﬄuent neigh-
borhoods are higher (the average quality of these phones is higher). ReCellular procures these used mobile
phones in bulk quantities from each source like the charitable foundations, and hence pays a common
procurement price for all the used phones to each source, as grading them and sorting them at the point of
purchase is considered to be time-consuming and expensive. After procuring the used phones, ReCellular
sorts out the used phones in terms of quality from the two primary classes of suppliers (this sorting process is
done by informal manual testing). ReCellular sells only those used phones in the secondary markets whose
quality level is higher than the level required by the market, and it disposes oﬀ the rest of the products.
The secondary markets are also heterogeneous, in that there are diﬀerent classes of customers. These
classes are based on the level of quality required by the customer and the prices they are willing to pay. A
higher required level of quality is associated with a higher price. In the event of a shortage, used mobile
phones of a higher level of quality can be substituted for phones of a lower level of quality.
To study the procurement decision analytically and quantify the beneﬁt of remanufacturing, we model
the heterogeneous supply of used or end-of-life mobile phones and the heterogeneous demand for these
phones in the secondary markets. More speciﬁcally, without a loss of generality, we consider a secondary
market with demand for two classes of products: one with a high level of quality and one with a low level of
quality. The prices that each of these classes of customers are willing to pay is known from historical data
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by the ﬁrm. As described in the example, we assume that there is a strict downward substitutability in the
demands for the two products, i.e., products of high quality are substitutes for products of low quality. On
the supply side, we model two diﬀerent classes of suppliers, the ﬁrst has a higher level of quality but charges
a higher price, while the second has a lower level of quality, but charges a lower price. We also assume that
the reseller is not the primary producer of the product but has remanufacturing capability (this is also borne
out by our observations in the industry, most resellers do not have the resources to invest in primary
production, but they have the resources to invest in the facilities needed for remanufacturing). Based on the
model, we investigate the following issues from the ﬁrms perspective:
1. What is the optimal number of used products that should be procured from the two classes of suppliers?
2. What is the cut-oﬀ quality level a product should have in order to be remanufactured instead of being
disposed?
3. What is the optimal number of products that should be remanufactured?
Some of the key results of the paper demonstrate that when the reseller can remanufacture used
products, the reseller prefers to procure a lower number of units from the two classes of suppliers (com-
pared to the case of no remanufacturing), as she can upgrade the used mobile phones which do not match
the required levels of quality by the market by remanufacturing. When the remanufacturing option is not
available, to be safe, the reseller has to procure a larger number of units, and then discard those units which
are not above the acceptable level of quality. Hence, remanufacturing provides a degree of ﬂexibility to the
reseller, since even if a signiﬁcantly larger proportion of used mobile phones in a lot are not of an acceptable
level of quality, some of them can be remanufactured to increase the available supply. We also ﬁnd that
when the cost per unit of remanufacturing is lower, the cut-oﬀ quality level that a product should have in
order to be remanufactured is lower. This second result is fairly intuitive, as a lower cost of remanufac-
turing enables the reseller to procure a lower number of used mobile phones, and then remanufacture a
larger number of phones which have a low level of quality to an acceptable level of quality (compared to the
case when remanufacturing is expensive). Finally, we also characterize the optimal number of products that
should be remanufactured, and ﬁnd that to be a function of: the acceptable levels of quality to the market,
the number procured initially by the manufacturer, the cost of remanufacturing, and the prices that the
markets are willing to pay for remanufactured products.
On a broader level, the paper contributes to our understanding about the interactions between pro-
curement and remanufacturing decisions. It also investigates the impact of uncertainty associated with
demand in secondary markets on the inﬂuence of the ﬂexibility provided by remanufacturing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we brieﬂy discuss the existing
literature that is related to the problem and the contribution of this paper. Section 3 is devoted to the
conceptualization and the formulation of the model. Following the development of the model, the ana-
lytical results for the optimal procurement decisions and the comparison of the remanufacturing and no
remanufacturing cases are done in Section 4. We provide a summary of our results and outline the limi-
tations of this paper and possible directions for future work in Section 5.
2. Literature
Towards the end of the technology life-cycle of a product and the beginning of a new life-cycle, the
reseller has to procure the used products from the primary markets and either sell them as-is or remanu-
facture them to products of acceptable quality and sell them in the secondary markets. Since there exists a
market for such used products in secondary markets, the reseller would like to sell them as quickly as
possible in the secondary market, so that they can be sold as competitive products. If the secondary market
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moves on to the next generation as well, the reseller may lose the market window of opportunity to sell the
used products. This problem of procurement and reselling is related to the well-established single period
newsvendor problem with multiple markets and suppliers, as there is a limited window of opportunity of
selling the used products in the secondary market. The single period newsvendor problem and its extensions
including those dealing with diﬀerent supplier pricing policies, diﬀerent states of information about de-
mand, and multiple products with substitution, have been studied in detail. While the paper uses the
methodology of the newsvendor problem to characterize the solution, the key contribution of the paper is
to examine the impact of remanufacturing on the procurement decision in addition. Comprehensive reviews
for the newsvendor problem and its extensions can be found in Khouja (1999) and Silver et al. (1998). In
this paper, demand for the lower quality products can be satisﬁed by high quality products (downward
substitution), which has been examined by Van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) and Smith and Agrawal (2000).
They examined a problem where a retailer has to select a number of product variants to stock in order to
maximize her expected proﬁt given the trade-oﬀ between inventory depth and variety breadth. In contrast,
our focus is on the impact of downward substitution on the procurement decisions of the high quality and
low quality products when remanufacturing can be used as an option. Ignall and Veinott (1969) examined a
multi-period model of determining procurement levels of multiple products with substitution and stochastic
demand, and determined conditions for the optimality of myopic policies. In a similar vein, Pasternack and
Drezner (1991) studied a similar problem with a joint density function of demand for two products; Bassok
et al. (1999) extended the work of Pasternack and Drezner by assuming a structure with N products and N
stochastic demands and a full downward substitution. This paper considers procuring from multiple classes
of suppliers with varying quality levels and the impact of remanufacturing for two products. While the
results of our model can be generalized to N multiple products, the focus of this paper is to obtain insights
into the impact of remanufacturing, hence, the results are presented for only two classes of products. Hsu
and Bassok (1999) extended the above studies to random demands and yields, Netessine et al. (2002)
considered a simpliﬁed version of the full downward substitution problem where only one level of
downward substitution is permitted. Their simplest formulation, which is a special case of the Bassok et al.
framework, allows them not only to characterize the optimal solutions, but also to investigate the impact of
correlation among demands. Our formulation for the demand is similar to that of Netessine et al. (2002),
but we do not consider shortage costs, overstock costs, or initial inventory, hence, we can get closed form
solutions, and focus on the impact of remanufacturing on procurement.
Similarly, the literature in remanufacturing that is associated with inventory control and distribution
planning (Minner and Kleber, 2000; Kiesm€uller et al., 2000), propose optimal inventory control policies for
a production line with remanufacturable products. In contrast, this paper considers multiple products with
downward substitution and characterizes the impact of multiple products. Another major issue of the
reverse distribution channels is the high degree of uncertainty in supply both in terms of quantity and
quality of used products (Thierry et al., 1995; Guide, 2000). While this paper models the uncertainty
associated with the supply of used products, the interaction between demand uncertainty and supply
uncertainty with remanufacturing is also considered. From a market-related perspective, Debo et al. (2001)
address the issue of a manufacturer producing a remanufacturable product in a market where consumers
are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay and value remanufactured products to be less than new. While
they focus on the interaction between markets and the resulting cannibalization, this paper also models
uncertainty in demand and supply. In a related vein, Savaskan et al. (1999) determine the optimal collection
channel of a monopolist manufacturer and Groenevelt and Majumder (2000) investigate the impact of
competition in remanufacturing. These studies do not consider procurement policies for the manufacturer.
Guide et al. (2001) ﬁnd the optimal selling and acquisition prices for a ﬁrm that buys and sells remanu-
factured products with an emphasis on the role of component durability. In this study, we model the
durability of components in a diﬀerent manner, using yield losses with two product classes, and two classes
of suppliers.
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In summary, this paper encompasses both procurement issues, wherein the quality of the procured
products is not ﬁxed but is a decision variable (it can be changed by remanufacturing), and in addition, a
market with downward substitution. The contribution of this paper is partly on the supply side, by
examining the eﬀect of remanufacturing on yield decisions. It also compares a situation without remanu-
facturing with one in which remanufacturing can be used as an option and it attempts to identify the
inﬂuence of the observed levels of quality on the decision to remanufacture.
Next, we present the modelling assumptions of the paper with the notation used for the two procurement
models.
3. Model assumptions and notation
We use the following notation throughout the paper: yi will denote the order quantities from each of the
suppliers (i ¼ 1; 2), and comprises the set of decision variables, xi will denote the demands of each of the
two classes of products, qi will denote the quality levels of the used products that are provided by each of
the two classes of suppliers, and the procurement costs of each of the two classes of suppliers are denoted by
a1 and a2. The prices oﬀered by the market are denoted by p1 for the higher quality products, and p2 for the
lower quality products. In general, we will use the subscript 1 for high quality products, and the subscript 2
for low quality products.
The primary goal of the paper is to understand the implications of having the remanufacturing option on
the procurement decisions of the reseller. Hence, we consider the following scenario and make the following
model assumptions.
The reseller procures used products from the two classes of suppliers, and acquires the procured
quantities from them at the unit price of a1 and a2 respectively. The reseller can then observe the quality
levels of the procured used products, and decide to remanufacture some of them, or not to use any
remanufacturing at all. The procured products will then be sold in the secondary markets in bulk.
Assumption 1. The demand for high quality products is independent of the demand for the low quality
products.
We assume that the prices of the two kinds of products are given and known, hence, we also assume that
there is no switching in terms of quality preference from the customers of the two demand types. The
assumption of the known prices is not justiﬁable in many dynamic markets, however, to keep the model
tractable, we do not focus on the optimal price path. The assumption is reasonable, since the average levels
of the high quality and low quality products will be stable, customers have already self-selected their class
by making known the product they prefer. Hence, there is no cannibalization of sales from one product
class to the other.
Assumption 2. The price and the margin obtained from the high quality product are higher than that
obtained from the low quality product (p1  a1 > p2  a2). Hence, the reseller always prefers to satisfy the
demand for high quality products ﬁrst, since it is more proﬁtable, and only in the event that the high quality
used products are in excess of the demand, will the reseller use them to satisfy any demand from the low
quality customer class.
This assumption is based on a number of studies done in product variety in the presence of cannibal-
ization (Moorthy and Png, 1992), which show that the high-end product has a higher margin, as customers
are willing to pay a higher net surplus for a better product. In this case, in fact, since the procurement has
been undertaken at the time of providing the products to the market, the ﬁrm will prefer to sell the high
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quality product ﬁrst to customers who are willing to pay more (p1, which is the higher price), as the
acquisition costs are sunk costs.
Assumption 3. When the acceptable proportion of the procured quantity of the high quality products is
greater than the demand for the high-quality products, the ﬁrm can sell the remainder to the customers who
prefer the low-quality products. In this case, customers will still pay the lower price p2 for the high quality
products. This assumption states that when downward substitution occurs, the customers in the class who
want the low quality products will accept the high quality products as a substitute, but are not willing to
pay the higher price for the product. This assumption is a direct result of Assumption 1, since if it is
violated, the two classes of customers will compete for high quality products.
Assumption 4. qaci , i ¼ 1; 2, denotes the acceptable quality levels of the high quality product and the low
quality product of the market.
Consequently, the reseller will be able to sell only those products which have a higher quality level than
qaci to the two classes of customers. In the case with no remanufacturing, the reseller has no option but to
dispose oﬀ the products which have a lower quality level than the acceptable levels of quality. When the
reseller has the option to remanufacture, she can choose to upgrade the quality levels of some of the units
to the acceptable levels of quality.
Assumption 5. The quantity of products supplied and demanded is large, hence, the distribution of demand
from the two product classes is assumed to be continuous. Let F1ðxÞ and f1ðxÞ be the c.d.f and p.d.f. for the
demand of the high quality products and F2ðxÞ and f2ðxÞ for the demand of the low quality products.
This assumption is fairly standard and enables us to use the ﬁrst order and second order conditions to
ﬁnd the optimal number of units to be procured.
In the ReCellular case, these assumptions can be shown to apply with some degree of realism. While the
grading and sorting at ReCellular is done with subjective judgement, a weighted average of quality measure can
be deﬁned to ﬁnd the acceptable level of quality by customers in secondary markets based on historical data.
Similarly, the cumulative demand distributions can be estimated in a truncated fashion from historical data.
Assumption 6. There is no ﬁxed cost associated with procuring used products from the two classes of
suppliers.
This assumption is also fairly standard, and makes the problem more tractable. If the ﬁxed costs for both
classes of suppliers are equal, then the ﬁrm will choose to order from both of them if the quantity of
products demanded in both classes is high, which is true from Assumption 5.
We also assume that the quality of the two classes of products is distributed with a c.d.fGðÞ and p.d.f gðÞ.
The mean of the distributions of quality is higher for products of high quality than products of low quality.
We now present the formulation of the model and the results.
4. Model formulation and results
4.1. No remanufacturing case
The framework for the case with no remanufacturing is depicted in Fig. 1. When the reseller does not
have the remanufacturing option, the reseller procures used products from the two classes of suppliers, and
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after sorting them, she only sells those products in the market whose quality is higher than the acceptable
quality level for that class, and then disposes oﬀ the rest of the products. Here, ynri , i ¼ 1; 2, denote the order
quantities from the two classes of suppliers for the case of no remanufacturing. To formulate the proﬁt
function for the case of downward substitution, we ﬁrst enumerate the demands and the proﬁt function if
the demand for the high quality product (product 1) is greater than the number of acceptable used high
quality products. In this case, the reseller sells the high quality product only to the ﬁrst class of customers
and the low quality product only to the second class of customers. Since the number of acceptable high
quality used products is ynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 Þ, the revenues for the reseller from the customers who want the high
quality product are given byZ 1
ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
p1ynr1 1
  Gðqac1 Þf1ðx1Þdx1:
Similarly, the revenues to the reseller from the customers who want the low quality product are given
by
1
"

Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
0
f1ðx1Þdx1
# Z ynr
2
1Gðqac
2
Þ½ 
0
p2x2f2ðx2Þdx2
" #
þ 1
"

Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
0
f1ðx1Þdx1
# Z 1
ynr
2
1Gðqac
2
Þ½ 
p2ynr2 1
"  Gðqac2 Þf2ðx2Þdx2
#
:
In the case when the demand of the high quality product is less than the acceptable number of high quality
products procured (½1 Gðqac1 Þ), two cases can exist. Either the demand of the low quality products is met
from the sum of the high quality and low quality products (ynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 Þ þ ynr2 ½1 Gðqac2 Þ  x1), or the
demand exceeds the sum of the remainder of the high quality and the low quality products. In the ﬁrst case,
the revenues of the reseller are given by
Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
0
Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ þynr2 1Gðqac2 Þ½ x1
0
ðp1x1 þ p2x2Þf1ðx1Þf2ðx2Þdx2 dx1:
Fig. 1. No remanufacturing case.
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In the second case, the revenues of the reseller are given by
Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
0
Z 1
ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ þynr2 1Gðqac2 Þ½ x1
p1x1
 þ p2 ynr1 1  Gðqac1 Þ
þ ynr2 1
  Gðqac2 Þ x1f1ðx1Þf2ðx2Þdx2 dx1:
The resellers proﬁt function is given by the sum of all the revenues in the previous cases minus the
acquisition costs of the products. Hence, the proﬁts of the reseller are given by
Pnrðynr1 ; ynr2 Þ
¼
Z 1
ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
p1ynr1 1
  Gðqac1 Þf1ðx1Þdx1 þ 1
"

Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
0
f1ðx1Þdx1
# Z ynr
2
1Gðqac
2
Þ½ 
0
p2x2f2ðx2Þdx2
" #
þ 1
"

Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
0
f1ðx1Þdx1
# Z 1
ynr
2
1Gðqac
2
Þ½ 
p2ynr2 1
"  Gðqac2 Þf2ðx2Þdx2
#
þ
Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
0
Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ þynr2 1Gðqac2 Þ½ x1
0
ðp1x1 þ p2x2Þf1ðx1Þf2ðx2Þdx2 dx1
þ
Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
0
Z 1
ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ þynr2 1Gðqac2 Þ½ x1
p1x1
 þ p2 ynr1 1  Gðqac1 Þ
þ ynr2 1
  Gðqac2 Þ x1f1ðx1Þf2ðx2Þdx2 dx1  a1ynr1  a2ynr2 : ð1Þ
The proﬁt function takes into account the fact that the reseller always prefers to sell the high quality
products ﬁrst, and only when high quality products are in excess does she prefer to substitute downward to
satisfy the demand for the low quality products with the high quality products.
To ﬁnd the optimal quantities to be procured by the reseller from the two classes of suppliers, we check
the ﬁrst order and second order conditions. This problem is similar in structure to the classical newsvendor
problem with multiple products and downward substitution, and it is easy to verify that the ﬁrst order
conditions are suﬃcient for an optimal solution. The optimal values of the quantities to be procured from
the two classes of suppliers ðynr1 ; ynr2 Þ are provided in the following result.
Result 1. The function Pnrðynr1 ; ynr2 Þ is concave in ynr1 , ynr2 . The optimal ynr1 , ynr2 satisfy the equations
p1 1
  F1 ynr1 1  Gðqac1 Þ p2 1  F1ðynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ 1  F2 ynr2 1  Gðqac2 Þ
¼ a1
1 Gðqac1 Þ½ 
 a2
1 Gðqac2 Þ½ 
Z ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ 
0
Z 1
ynr
1
1Gðqac
1
Þ½ þynr2 1Gðqac2 Þ½ x1
p2f1ðx1Þf2ðx2Þdx1 dx2
þ p2 1
  F1 ynr1 1  Gðqac1 Þ 1  F2 ynr2 1  Gðqac2 Þ ¼ a21 Gðqac2 Þ½  : ð2Þ
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix A. h
The intuition in the ﬁrst order condition (2) for the optimal number of used products to be procured
from the ﬁrst supplier is that at the optimal ynr1 , the marginal beneﬁt of having one more high quality
A. Robotis et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 163 (2005) 688–705 695
product to substitute for a lower quality product is zero. It is easy to see as the price of the ﬁrst product (p1)
increases, the eﬀect is to increase the optimal value of ynr1 , as ½1 F1ðynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ has to decrease, hence,
ynr1 has to increase. Similarly, if the price of the second product (p2) increases, the optimal y
nr
1 decreases.
Similarly, one can see using the ﬁrst order condition for the acceptable level of quality qac1 that as the
acceptable level of quality for the high quality product increases, the optimal quantity of ynr1 increases, as
the market is more demanding, and hence, yield losses force the reseller to order more of the high quality
product. For the second ﬁrst order condition (2), the intuition is that at the optimal ynr2 the marginal beneﬁt
(proﬁt) of having one more lower quality product to sell is zero. It is easy to see that a similar set of
observations can be made about the eﬀect of prices and the acceptable level of quality for the second
product. These results conﬁrm our intuition from the literature.
4.2. Remanufacturing case
In the remanufacturing case the buyer (reseller) faces the decision to remanufacture products from a
lower quality level to the acceptable quality level for that product. This is modelled as follows: there is a
cost of remanufacturing a product that is currently at a lower level of quality (qi, i ¼ 1; 2) up to the higher
quality level qaci and this cost is modelled as Kiðqi; qaci Þ. We assume that K is convex with respect to the
diﬀerential of quality. Since the cost will be lower if the starting quality of the product (qi) is higher, we
model it to be a decreasing function of qi. Let Ciðqi; qaci Þ ¼
R qaci
qi
Kiðqi; qaci ÞgðqÞdq denote the average
remanufacturing cost per product for bringing a product with quality qi6 qaci to quality qaci . It follows from
our assumptions that since product 1 is the product with the higher level of quality, it will be more
expensive for the reseller to remanufacture a given product to the acceptable level of quality of the ﬁrst
product than the second product (K1ðq1; qac1 ÞPK2ðq1; qac2 Þ), since high quality products have more expensive
components and the value added to make them acceptable must be higher. The framework for the case of
remanufacturing is depicted in Fig. 2.
Let yr1, y
r
2 denote the ordering quantities in the remanufacturing case. In a similar vein to the non-
remanufacturing case, the proﬁt function for the remanufacturing case is
Fig. 2. Remanufacturing case.
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1
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The structure of the proﬁts for the remanufacturing case has the same set of conditions as the non-
remanufacturing case, the only important distinction is that we must now decide the values of q1 and q2,
which are the cut-oﬀ levels of quality for which the reseller undertakes remanufacturing. The trade-oﬀ
associated with remanufacturing is simple, there is a larger number of acceptable products with remanu-
facturing, however, the ﬁrm also incurs the costs of remanufacturing, which are the last two terms in Eq.
(3). As before, we use the ﬁrst and second order conditions for the optimal values of the number of used
products to be procured from the two classes of suppliers ðyr1; yr2Þ. These values are characterized in the
following result.
Result 2. The function Prðyr1; yr2; q1; q2Þ is concave in yr1, yr2. The optimal yr1, yr2 satisfy the equation
p1½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ  p2½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ½1 F2ðyr2½1 Gðq2ÞÞ
¼ ðC1ðq1; q
ac
1 Þ þ a1Þ
½1 Gðq1Þ 
ðC2ðq2; qac2 Þ þ a2Þ
½1 Gðq2Þ
Z yr
1
½1Gðq1Þ
0
Z 1
yr
1
½1Gðq1Þþyr2½1Gðq2Þx1
p2½1 Gðq2Þf1ðx1Þ
 f2ðx2Þdx1 dx2 þ p2½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ½1 F2ðyr2½1 Gðq2ÞÞ ¼
C2ðq2; qac2 Þ þ a2
½1 Gðq2Þ : ð4Þ
The intuition behind Result 2 is the same as the intuition behind Result 1, but there is an important
diﬀerence. In this case, when the value of q1 increases in the ﬁrst condition (for yr1), the denominator of the
ﬁrst term on the right hand side (½1 Gðq1Þ) is a decreasing function of q1, but the numerator is decreasing
as well in q1. We now characterize the optimal remanufacturing qualities q1, q2 in the following result.
Result 3. The function Prðyr1; yr2; q1; q2Þ is concave in q1, q2. The optimal quality level qi, i ¼ 1; 2, is given by
 dðCiðqi ;qaci ÞÞ
dqi
ðCiðqi; qaci Þ þ aiÞ
¼ gðqiÞ½1 GðqiÞ ð5Þ
A. Robotis et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 163 (2005) 688–705 697
for qi < qaci , and by
qi ¼ qaci
for qiP qaci .
In addition, the optimal qi is a decreasing function of the acquisition cost ai (qi decreases as ai increases).
Note that since Kiðqi; qaci Þ is a decreasing function of qi therefore ddqi Ciðqi; qaci Þ < 0. The right term of Eq.
(5) is the hazard rate of the distribution function gðÞ of qi. Eq. (5) shows that at the optimal qi, the ratio of
the rate at which the cost increases to the total cost is equal to the hazard rate of qi. This is similar to results
obtained in renewal theory, which relate the hazard rate of the function to the renewal cycle.
The intuition behind Result 3 is rather surprising since it might be expected that as the acquisition cost of
the product increases, it would be better to choose a higher level of quality as the point where the reseller
would like to begin remanufacturing. This would keep the remanufacturing cost down, and would help to
reduce the total cost of the product, as the acquisition costs are already high (recall that
Ciðqi; qaci Þ ¼
R qaci
qi
Kiðqi; qaci ÞgðqÞdq). On the other hand, if the acquisition cost of the product is low, one
would expect to be able to add an additional remanufacturing cost to the acquisition cost but still keep the
total cost of the product low. Surprisingly, one sees the opposite result, i.e., if the acquisition cost is already
high, the reseller prefers to incur higher remanufacturing costs as well. To get a better feeling of the
intuition behind this result, consider the following simpliﬁed example with one product and one market: the
reseller wants to buy and sell one product with a probability distribution of the quality given by:
Prðquality > qacÞ ¼ 1
2
. In this case the buyer will have to buy two products because with probability 50%,
one of these products will have quality > qac that the market ﬁnds acceptable. Alternatively, instead of
paying for 2 products, the buyer might be better oﬀ, remanufacturing cost permitting, to buy only one
product and to pay an additional cost to remanufacture this product. Hence, the intuition behind this result
can be summarized as follows. If the acquisition cost is high, the reseller prefers to order a smaller quantity
of products, and then remanufacture some of the products with lower levels of quality to acceptable levels
of quality. In this case, a higher acquisition cost gives the reseller an incentive to remanufacture more,
compensating for the additional cost by reducing the number of products that will be procured, and hence,
will be disposed. Even though this strategy may increase the average cost per product, since the number of
products procured is lower, the total cost is lower. The intuition holds for the case with 2 markets and
downward substitution as the following proposition conﬁrms.
Proposition 1. The number of units procured optimally from the two classes of suppliers in the remanufac-
turing case is lower than the number of units procured in the no-remanufacturing case. The proﬁts of the
reseller with remanufacturing are at least equal to or higher than the proﬁts of the reseller without remanu-
facturing.
Mathematically, this can be represented as
yr16 ynr1 ;
yr26 ynr2 ;
Pnrðynr1 ; ynr2 Þ6Prðyr1; yr2; q1; q2Þ:
Proposition 1 provides a very interesting insight, which provides the basis for most of the results in the
paper. While the decision to remanufacture might increase the total cost per product procured, it decreases
the total costs because fewer products will be procured in order to satisfy the demand. In terms of man-
agerial practice, this has a number of interesting implications. Since the number of procured units is lower
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with remanufacturing, the reseller may be able to reduce the supplier base, and focus on the more reliable
suppliers, which may result in additional beneﬁts, which have not been modelled here. It also results in a
lower number of disposed units (since the total number procured is lower, and the proportion of disposed
units is still lower, since many of the products with lower levels of quality were remanufactured into
products with acceptable levels of quality). The lower number of disposed units results in a net environ-
mental beneﬁt as well. We will now illustrate the results with a numerical example and conclude the paper
by providing the main contributions, insights and limitations.
4.3. An example
To illustrate the results, suppose that the demands for high quality products and low quality products
follow a normal distribution with mean 10,000 and variance 2000. Also assume that the quality distribution
for high quality products is normal with mean 0.7 and standard deviation 0.1. Thus quality level varies
approximately from 0.4 to 1 with 0.4 the worst quality and 1 the best. The accepted quality level for high
quality products is qac1 ¼ 0:75. Similarly assume that the quality distribution for the low quality products is
normal with mean 0.3, standard deviation 0.1, and qac2 ¼ 0:35. Thus quality level varies approximately from
0 to 0.6. For the selling prices and acquisition costs assume that p1 ¼ 30, a1 ¼ 9, p2 ¼ 15, a2 ¼ 2. Then we
have that ½1 Gðqac1 Þ ¼ 0:308 and ½1 Gðqac2 Þ ¼ 0:309. From Eq. (2) we ﬁnd ynr1 ¼ 33,131 and ynr2 ¼ 31,002.
For the remanufacturing case, assume that the cost to remanufacture the high quality products is
K1ðq; qac1 Þ ¼ 30 30q. Notice that if q ¼ 0, then the cost to remanufacture the product becomes equal to the
selling price of the product. Similarly for the lower quality product assume K2ðq; qac2 Þ ¼ 15 15q. From Eq.
(5) we ﬁnd that q1 ¼ 0:4576 and q2 ¼ 0:0001. Thus the average remanufacturing cost for the high quality is
C1ðq1; qac1 Þ ¼
R qac
1
q1
K1ðq1; qac1 ÞgðqÞdq ¼
R 0:75
0:4576
ð30 30qÞdq ¼ 7:15, and for the low quality product,
C2ðq2; qac2 Þ ¼
R qac
2
q2
K2ðq2; qac2 ÞgðqÞdq ¼
R 0:35
0:0001
ð15 15qÞdq ¼ 7:76. Notice that since the margin for the high
quality product (p1  a1) is bigger than that of the low quality, it is better to remanufacture almost all of the
low quality products to avoid downward substitution even though you make the remanufacturing cost for
the low quality products bigger than that of the high quality. Thus the total cost per product for the high
quality is C1ðq1; qac1 Þ þ a1 ¼ 7:15þ 9 ¼ 16:15 and for the low quality C2ðq2; qac2 Þ þ a2 ¼ 7:76þ 2 ¼ 9:76.
From Eq. (4) we obtain yr1¼ 11,314 and yr2¼ 11,223.
5. Contributions, limitations and future research
The use of remanufacturing as an option for value added resellers has important ramiﬁcations for
resellers, used product collection agencies, customers in developing and advanced markets. The paper uses
a model that is based on a real-life situation, and models trade-oﬀs that are faced by resellers in the mobile
phone industry. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper has been to show that by adding value by remanu-
facturing and making the used products more attractive to customers, resellers can increase their proﬁts
signiﬁcantly. The second contribution of this paper is to show that by using remanufacturing, resellers can
procure lower quantities, and eliminate some of their suppliers who may be providing items of quality that
are consistently lower than the other suppliers in their class. The paper also shows that products whose
acquisition prices are high are preferable for remanufacturing over products that have a low acquisition
price. Lastly, the paper provides insights on when it is useful to remanufacture used products that are
collected from the market, versus when it is useful to dispose oﬀ procured products, as remanufacturing
them may not add to the proﬁts.
In the early phase of this research, we have made a number of assumptions that must be relaxed in future
research to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the value of remanufacturing to resellers. We
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modelled the heterogeneity in the suppliers and in the market by assuming that there are only two classes of
suppliers with a high quality and a low quality, and correspondingly, there are only two classes in the
market, which prefer the respective products. While the analysis is cumbersome, our numerical studies show
that the results and the insights behind the results can be extended to the case where suppliers and cus-
tomers are divided into N classes. Future research can extend this study to N diﬀerent classes of suppliers
and M classes of customers with corresponding rules of allocation and substitution between these classes.
We also did not assume multiple periods, or the existence of any backorder or salvage costs. Studies that
incorporated the eﬀect of multiple periods, salvage values and backorder costs could enhance the appli-
cability of the model. While we did not consider disposal costs, we conjecture that if the reseller has disposal
costs to be incurred for unsold products, then the procured quantities will be lower and the number of
products remanufactured will be higher, strengthening the results of the model.
We also assumed that customers had clearly self-selected themselves into the two respective customer
classes, and the actual yield or average quality level provided by the suppliers had no inﬂuence on their
decision. Future research should consider the impact of varying net utility surpluses based on the observed
quality of the lot of used products. We also assumed that the prices being oﬀered by the two customer
classes were exogenous and known a priori by the reseller. While this can be empirically true in some
industries, there are a number of industries where this observation fails to hold true, and prices are either
varying or negotiated based on the average quality of the lot. Studies that extend the research done here
should investigate the impact of strategic pricing or value based pricing mechanisms on the results of the
model.
We also assumed that the acceptable level of quality of a product could be pre-determined, and enabled
the ﬁrm to clearly sort out products, which could be sold versus those that had to be disposed. While this
supply side constraint can be justiﬁed for some product categories where the acceptable level of quality is
based on the conformance of the product to a checklist, it may be more diﬃcult to measure the performance
quality of a product and decide the acceptable level. Empirical studies should be conducted to determine the
kinds of product categories where this model can be applied. We are also not aware of any empirical
studies, which relate the cost of remanufacturing an item and the corresponding level of increase in the
quality. While this relationship is conceptually sound, studies that benchmark the cost of remanufacturing
against the increased levels of quality observed would be useful for the application of the model.
In summary, this paper makes a contribution to the literature on the procurement policies of value
added resellers by drawing attention to the option of remanufacturing products to increase their value, and
developing a model of the trade-oﬀs underlying such decisions. Our recommendation is that ﬁrms look at
remanufacturing to at least some extent as a mechanism of reducing their procurement quantities under
yield losses, and use remanufacturing to reduce their yield losses in conjunction with the procurement
policy. While remanufacturing may have the direct beneﬁt of increasing the ﬁrms proﬁts, it may have the
indirect beneﬁt of reducing the number of units procured, hence enabling the ﬁrm to consolidate its supplier
base.
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Appendix A
Proof of Result 1. See the proof of Result 2. h
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Proof of Result 2. First we will ﬁnd the derivative of Pðyr1; yr2; q1; q2Þ. Consider the second term of Eq. (3).
We have
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For the third term of Eq. (3) we have
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Adding the above equations we obtain the term
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For the fourth term of Eq. (3) we have
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Similarly for the optimal yr1 we haveZ yr
1
½1Gðq1Þ
0
Z 1
yr
1
½1Gðq1Þþyr2½1Gðq2Þx1
p2f1ðx1Þf2ðx2Þdx1 dx2 þ p1½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ
¼ C1ðq1; q
ac
1 Þ þ a1
½1 Gðq1Þ : ðA:4Þ
Subtracting (A.3) from (A.4) we obtain the desired result. To prove that Pðyr1; yr2Þ is concave in yr1; yr2 notice
that d
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P 0. We will now ﬁnd the derivative of (3) term by term. We have
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and for the third term
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Adding these terms together we obtain
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0
gðqÞdq

þ yr2 1


Z q2
0
gðqÞdq

 x1

dx1;
and for the ﬁfth term
d
dq2
Z yr
1
1
R q1
0
gðqÞ dq
h i
0
Z 1
yr
1
1
R q1
0
gðqÞ dq
h i
þyr
2
1
R q2
0
gðqÞ dq
h i
x1
p1x1
0B@ þ p2 yr1 1


Z q1
0
gðqÞdq

þ yr2 1


Z q2
0
gðqÞdq

 x1

f1ðx1Þf2ðx2Þdx2 dx1
1
CA
¼
Z yr
1
1
R q1
0
gðqÞ dq
h i
0
Z 1
yr
1
1
R q1
0
gðqÞ dq
h i
þyr
2
1
R q2
0
gðqÞ dq
h i
x1
p2yr2½gðq2Þf1ðx1Þf2ðx2Þdx2

Z yr
1
1
R q1
0
gðqÞ dq
h i
0
yr2½gðq2Þ p1x1

þ p2 yr1 1


Z q1
0
gðqÞdq

þ yr2 1


Z q2
0
gðqÞdq

 x1

f1ðx1Þf2 yr1 1


Z q1
0
gðqÞdq

þ yr2 1


Z q2
0
gðqÞdq

 x1

dx1:
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Finally adding all the terms, taking the derivative of C2ðq1; qac2 Þyr2, with respect to q2, dividing with the term
yr2½gðq2Þ and using the result of Result 2 the desired result is obtained.
At this point it can be proved by contradiction that the optimal qi is a decreasing function of the
acquisition cost ai. Assuming a product with cost function Kðq; qacÞ, acquisition costs a1, a2, with a2 > a1
and q2 > q1 ()Gðq2Þ > Gðq1Þ). Since q2 > q1 we have that C2ðq2; qacÞ ¼
R qac
q2
Kðq; qacÞgðqÞdq >R qac
q1
Kðq; qacgðqÞÞdq ¼ C1ðq1; qacÞ.
The diﬀerential equations
dðCiðqi ;q
ac
i
ÞÞ
dqi
ðCiðqi;qaci ÞþaiÞ
¼ gðqiÞ½1GðqiÞ have solutions for an initial condition Cð0; qaci Þ ¼ C0P 0:
C1ðq1; qac1 Þ ¼ ð1þ Gðq1ÞÞða1  C0Þ  a1;
C2ðq2; qac1 Þ ¼ ð1þ Gðq2ÞÞða2  C0Þ  a2:
ðA:5Þ
Subtracting we obtain
C0ðGðq1Þ  Gðq2ÞÞ þ a1Gðq1Þ  a2Gðq2ÞP 0; ðA:6Þ
and C0ðGðq1Þ  Gðq2ÞÞ6 0 by our assumptions. That means that a1Gðq1Þ  a2Gðq2ÞP 0. Since Gðq2Þ >
Gðq1Þ we have that a1Gðq1Þ  a2Gðq2ÞP 0 ) a1Gðq2Þ  a2Gðq2Þ ) a1 > a2 (contradiction). h
Proof of Proposition 1. Let
znr1 ¼ 1
  F1ðynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ; znr2 ¼ 1  F1ðynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ 1  F2ðynr2 ½1 Gðqac2 ÞÞ:
Also let
zr1 ¼ 1
  F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ; zr2 ¼ 1  F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ 1  F2ðyr2½1 Gðq2ÞÞ:
From Results 2 and 1, since the double integral terms are always greater or equal to zero we obtain
p2znr2  p2zr26
a2
1 Gðqac2 Þ½ 
 C2ðq2; q
ac
2 Þ
½1 Gðq2Þ 
a2
½1 Gðq2Þ 6
a2
1 Gðqac2 Þ½ 
 C2ðq2; q
ac
2 Þ
½1 Gðq2Þ 
a2
1 Gðqac2 Þ½ 
6 0:
ðA:7Þ
Subtracting now the ﬁrst of the terms from Results 2 and 1 and noticing that the optimal q2 < q1 otherwise
there is no meaning to remanufacture the low quality products, we obtain
p1zr1  p1znr1 þ p2znr2  p2zr2
¼ C1ðq1; q
ac
1 Þ þ a1
½1 Gðq1Þ 
C2ðq2; qac1 Þ þ a2
½1 Gðq2Þ 
a1
1 Gðqac1 Þ½ 
 a2
1 Gðqac2 Þ½ 
P
C1ðq1; qac1 Þ þ a1
½1 Gðq1Þ 
C2ðq2; qac1 Þ þ a2
½1 Gðq2Þ 
a1
½1 Gðq1Þ 
a2
½1 Gðq2Þ
¼ C1ðq1; q
ac
1 Þ þ a1
½1 Gðq1Þ 
C2ðq2; qac1 Þ þ a2
½1 Gðq2Þ P
C1ðq1; qac1 Þ þ a1
½1 Gðq2Þ 
C2ðq2; qac1 Þ þ a2
½1 Gðq2Þ P 0: ðA:8Þ
Since p2znr2  p2zr26 0, we have
p1zr1  p1znr1 P 0) ½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ  ½1 F1ðynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ
P ½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ  ½1 F1ðynr1 ½1 Gðq1ÞÞ ) F1ðyr1Þ6 F1ðynr1 Þ ) yr16 ynr1 :
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For the second inequality we have
p2znr2  p2zr26 0) ½1 F1ðynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ½1 F2ðynr2 ½1 Gðqac2 ÞÞ
 ½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ½1 F2ðyr2½1 Gðq2ÞÞ6 0
) ½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðq1ÞÞ½1 F2ðyr2½1 Gðq2ÞÞ
 ½1 F1ðynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ½1 F2ðynr2 ½1 Gðqac2 ÞÞP 0
) ½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ½1 F2ðyr2½1 Gðqac2 ÞÞ
 ½1 F1ðynr1 ½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ½1 F2ðynr2 ½1 Gðqac2 ÞÞP 0
) ½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ½1 F2ðyr2½1 Gðqac2 ÞÞ
 ½1 F1ðyr1½1 Gðqac1 ÞÞ½1 F2ðynr2 ½1 Gðqac2 ÞÞP 0
) F2ðyr2Þ6 F2ðynr2 Þ ) yr26 ynr2 : 
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